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On October 25, 1996, the Institute of Bill of Rights Law at the College
of William & Mary School of Law held its ninth annual Supreme Court
Preview. Each year, legal scholars and journalists from around the country
gather to survey the upcoming Supreme Court Term. This year's Preview
began with a moot court argument of Clinton v. Jones,' President Clinton's
appeal to the United States Supreme Court which was heard by the Court on
January 13, 1997.
Paula Corbin Jones, a former Arkansas state employee, filed a civil
action for damages in 1994 against President William Jefferson Clinton for
conduct in which he allegedly engaged while serving as Governor of Arkan-
sas in 1991.2 Jones's complaint alleged sexual harassment and discrimina-
tion as well as defamation resulting from Clinton's press aides' and
attorneys' public denials of Jones's allegations.
The issue before the Supreme Court is whether a civil action may be
asserted against the President of the United States while he is in office when
the underlying alleged facts in the complaint arose before his election and
assumption of office. President Clinton asserted absolute presidential immu-
nity. The Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas denied
the President's motion3 and held that although the trial should be postponed
until the President leaves office, discovery and the deposition process should
proceed as to all persons, including the President.' On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the President was not entitled, as a
matter of law, to a postponement or a stay of all proceedings in the suit for
Special thanks to April Artesian, whose assistance as court reporter made this
transcript possible.
.. Dean, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. B.A., Yale University;
M.Sc., London School of Economics; J.D., University of Chicago.
"'" Arthur B. Hanson Professor of Law, William & Mary School of Law. B.A., Yale
University; J.D., Duke University.
1 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996), granting cert. to 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir.).
2 Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Ark. 1994), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996).
3 Id. at 699.
4 Id. at 699-700.
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the duration of his presidency.' The court found that such a postponement
effectively would operate as a grant of official immunity for acts beyond the
"'outer perimeter' of [the President's] official responsibility, ' as set forth
by the Supreme Court in Nixon v. Fitzgerald.7 Additionally, the Eighth
Circuit reversed the district court's grant to President Clinton of what that
court had termed a "temporary or limited immunity from trial" for acts
beyond the outer perimeter of his official responsibility.8
On appeal, the Supreme Court is considering whether presidential immu-
nity requires dismissal of a civil suit against the President without prejudice,
to be refiled after he leaves the White House, or if immunity requires a stay
of such proceedings until he leaves office.In the mock argument, Professor Rodney Smolla represented President
Clinton, the petitioner. Dean Michael Gerhardt represented Ms. Jones, the
respondent. A panel of two law professors and seven legal journalists adopt-
ed the roles of the Justices of the United States Supreme Court.9
The legal arguments presented are not necessarily representative of the
beliefs or opinions held by Professors Smolla and Gerhardt. The advocates







Friday, October 25, 1996
Oral Argument in the above-entitled matter:
Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996).
Id. at 1359 (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 756 (1982).
7 475 U.S. 731 (1982).
8 Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 699.
9 The following participants comprised the nine-Justice panel: Joan Biskupic,
Washington Post (Chief Justice); Richard Carelli, Associated Press; Aaron Epstein,
Knight-Ridder Newspapers; Linda Greenhouse, New York Times; Tony Mauro, USA
Today; Harry G. Prince, Professor of Law, University of California-Hastings College of
the Law; David Savage, Los Angeles Times; The Honorable Margaret P. Spencer,
Judge, General District Court of the City of Richmond, Virginia; and Kathryn Urbonya,
Professor of Law, Georgia State University School of Law.
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BEFORE:
JOAN BISKUPIC, Chief Justice
RICHARD CARELLI, Associate Justice
AARON EPSTEIN, Associate Justice
LINDA GREENHOUSE, Associate Justice
TONY MAURO, Associate Justice
HARRY G. PRINCE, Associate Justice
DAVID SAVAGE, Associate Justice
THE HONORABLE MARGARET P. SPENCER, Associate Justice
KATHRYN URBONYA, Associate Justice
APPEARANCES:
PROFESSOR RODNEY A. SMOLLA, William & Mary School of Law,
on behalf of Petitioner.
DEAN MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, Case Western Reserve University
School of Law, on behalf of Respondent.
PROCEEDINGS
ORAL ARGUMENT OF
PROFESSOR RODNEY A. SMOLLA
ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER
MR. SMOLLA: Chief Justice, and may it please the Court, I am
Rodney Smolla, and I represent the President of the
United States. I'd like to reserve one minute of time
for rebuttal.
Your Honors, William Jefferson Clinton was'elected
President of the United States in 1992. This lawsuit
was filed in 1994.0 It was precipitated by events
that allegedly occurred in 1991 while Mr. Clinton
was Governor of Arkansas. In the court below, the
President sought, alternatively, a dismissal of the suit
without prejudice, or that it be reinstated when he
finished his term of office (requesting a stay of the
proceedings until such time as he is no longer Presi-
dent).
The District Court did not dismiss the case but did
10 Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 690.
See id. at 691.
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grant the stay; however, the district court permitted
discovery to proceed.12 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district
court in part. The two-to-one majority of the court of
appeals ruled that the case should proceed in its en-
tirety immediately. 3 It is from that judgment of the
Eighth Circuit that the President has brought this ap-
peal.
Counselor, you're moving back and forth between
representing Mr. Clinton and representing the Presi-
dent. Which is it, and is that important?
It's our submission, Your Honor, that for the pur-
poses of the motion in this litigation the two are
inseparable. There is only one President. The Consti-
tution vests the executive power of the United States
in the President of the United States.14 Constitution-
ally speaking, the President is never off duty. The
President never sleeps. So although this is a lawsuit
arising from actions outside of the President's official
duties, seeing him in his individual capacity, his
assertion of privilege in this case-a right to have
this lawsuit deferred until he is no longer Presi-
dent-is inextricably intertwined with his constitu-
tional duties.
Though I hear you arguing that the office is entitled
to immunity, in all of our decisions dealing with
absolute immunity-a form of which you're arguing
in this case-we have recognized it as a functional
approach, one that doesn't attach to the office but to
the function of the particular person performing it.
Justice Urbonya, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,5 which is
12 Id. at 699.
13 Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996).
14 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
5 457 U.S. 731 (1982). In 1968, near the conclusion of the presidency of Lyndon B.
Johnson, Fitzgerald, a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force, testi-
fied before a congressional subcommittee about cost-overruns and unexpected technical
difficulties concerning the development of a particular airplane. Id. at 734. In January
1970, during the presidency of Richard M. Nixon, Fitzgerald's job was eliminated as
part of a departmental reorganization and reduction in work force. Id. at 735. Fitzgerald
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THE COURT:
MR. SMOLLA:
the closest precedent from this Court thus far on this
issue, Justice Powell actually rejected the idea that
when dealing with the presidency we can subdivide it
into various kinds of functions. 6 That is why in that
case the Court held that any action that is within the
outer perimeter of the President's duties would be
entitled to absolute immunity. 7 We're not seeking
absolute immunity, and concededly, this lawsuit does
not involve official actions of the President. But we
would say that the gist of Justice Powell's observa-
tions for the Court is nevertheless accurate. You
cannot subdivide into constituent parts the operation
of the presidency. That is one of the essential prob-
lems with the Eighth Circuit's reasoning, that we can
rely on the district court's discretion in this case to
avoid any conflict with the executive branch by ac-
commodating the President's schedule as needed.
Counsel, aren't you taking a broad extension? In
Nixon, the Court was talking about the official act.
Granted, we really do not have a precedent that con-
trols in this situation, but Nixon was about conduct
that took place while the President was in office.
This case is about conduct allegedly engaged in prior
to the President taking office.
That would clearly be an extension of the principles
in Nixon, one that is consistent with the Nixon case.
But Nixon is clearly not dispositive here. The Nixon
case turned on two rationales. One, the classic ratio-
nale that applies to immunities generally in the exec-
utive branch, which is that one seeks to free execu-
tive officers of inhibition in the exercise of their
authority. 8 We don't want executive officers subject
sued for damages against various Department of Defense officials and White House
aides allegedly responsible for his dismissal, and an amended complaint later named
President Nixon as a defendant. Id. at 739-40.
16 Id. at 756 (Powell, J.).
17 Id. ("In view of the special nature of the President's constitutional office and
functions, we think it appropriate to recognize absolute Presidential immunity from
damages liability for acts within the 'outer perimeter' of his official responsibility.").
18 Id. at 744-45 ("In the absence of immunity ... executive officials would hesitate
to exercise their discretion in a way 'injuriously affect[ing] the claims of particular indi-
viduals,' even when the public interest required bold and unhesitating action.") (quoting
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to suit every time they make a decision that disap-
points someone. But a second prominent theme in
that case was the idea that we do not want to divert
the energies of the President of the United States to
contend with litigation.9
I read that case. It seems to me the first reason was
really the basic one in that instance. I think there is
one sentence that talks about diverting the President
from his normal constitutional duties. Are you rely-
ing on that one sentence?
I think there may be two sentences, Your Honor, but
in the Nixon case the Court did not have occasion to
deal with the question of what kind of immunity, if
any, ought to attach when we are not dealing with an
official function of the presidency. It isn't so much
how many sentences or how prominent the theme of
the diversion of energies is in Nixon, but rather, what
is the right answer. And Nixon does talk in sweeping
terms about the functional approach to separation of
powers, the need to look with a pragmatic sense at
the role of the President in our constitutional system,
and the debilitating effects of litigation on anybody,
particularly a President, in this context. So those
themes are fully consistent with the submission that
we're making.
You said a moment ago that the President never
sleeps. I assume you mean constitutionally?
Yes, although with this President, Your Honor, there
may also be a personal element to that.
I suppose what you're really saying is that the Presi-
dent can get called away from any activity to attend
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 499 (1896)).
9 Writing for the majority, Justice Powell noted:
In view of the visibility of his office and the effect of his actions on countless
people, the President would be an easily identifiable target for suits for civil dam-
ages. Cognizance of this personal vulnerability frequently could distract a Presi-
dent from his public duties, to the detriment of not only the President and his
office but also the Nation that the Presidency is designed to serve.
254 [Vol. 5:1




to a crisis or some other serious form of business.
Well, he plays golf. He, as we know, campaigns, and
has been campaigning for months. Why can't he be
called away from one of those activities-he attends
many social events and dinners-to give a deposition
or talk to his lawyers about a settlement? Wouldn't
that be very easy for him to do?
Not very easy, Your Honor. As a practical matter,
many of those social events are semi-official events.
The President may be conducting business or talking
to aides. He may be relaxing, which is. actually a
good, healthy thing that the American people proba-
bly want their President to be able to do from time to
time, given the enormous stress of the position,
unique in the world. But whether at a given moment
the President is, in fact, engaged entirely in personal,
relaxing activities, it is integral to our position here
that it is not, with all respect, for the judiciary to
second-guess the President as to how he or she
chooses to use personal time. A district court would
be placed in the constitutionally embarrassing posi-
tion of passing on the President's schedule, of tak-
ing-
The lower court said they would give a great deal of
deference to the President and his schedule, arranging
proceedings in accordance with various other de-
mands on his time.2°
It's our view, Your Honor, that the cure suggested by
the Eighth Circuit is actually worse than the disease,
because although one can say, "Yes, we'll defer to
the President," imagine that the President were to
play this in a tough manner. Imagine if the President
were to say, "I'm sorry, I can't be bothered for the
next six months because there are hostilities in the
Middle East that I must attend to, and I am just not
going to be distracted for an hour a day, two hours a
20 Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354, 1367 (8th Cir.) (Beam, J., concurring) ("[N]othing
prohibits the trial judge from halting or delaying or rescheduling any proposed action by
any party at any time should she find that the duties of the presidency are even slightly
imperiled."), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996).
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day-whatever it takes-to deal with serious civil
litigation."
Isn't it true that this President has, in fact, given
depositions in litigation while he's been sitting, depo-
sitions that were arranged for his convenience
through good case management by the sitting judges
and the parties? We have actual experience that this
can be worked out, do we not?
Justice Greenhouse, this President and several past
Presidents have given testimony only in criminal
proceedings. No party has been able to point to any
past instance in which a sitting President has given
evidence in a civil proceeding.
In fact, there have been only three civil suits involv-
ing unofficial acts against Presidents.2
All of them were in effect settled before the
President's term had even substantially begun. There
were two cases disposed of before the President took
office,22 and President Kennedy's case was settled
very shortly after he took office.23 But more impor-
21 Bailey v. Kennedy, No. 757,200 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 5, 1962) & Hills v. Ken-
nedy, No. 757,201 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 5, 1962) (cases consolidated); DeVault v. Tru-
man, 194 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. 1946); New York ex rel. Hurley v. Roosevelt, 71 N.E. 1137
(N.Y. 1904).
' In New York ex rel. Hurley v. Roosevelt, 71 N.E. 11.37 (N.Y. 1904), Theodore
Roosevelt was sued in his capacity as Chairman of the New York City Police Depart-
ment, a position he held in 1895. An intermediate court of appeals affirmed dismissal of
the complaint nine months before he became President. New York ex rel. Hurley v.
Roosevelt, 56 A.D. 626 (N.Y. App. Div. 1900), aff'd, 71 N.E. 1137 (N.Y. 1904). The
New York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal without opinion in 1904 while Pres-
ident Roosevelt was in office. Hurley, 71 N.E. at 1137.
In DeVault v. Truman, 194 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. 1946), the plaintiff alleged that in 1931
Harry Truman and other judges in Jackson County, Missouri improperly committed him
to a mental institution. The action was initiated in November 1944, and the trial court
granted Truman's motion to dismiss. Truman became President in April 1945. One year
later, the Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the dismissal. See id. at 32.
' In Bailey v. Kennedy, No. 757,200 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 5, 1962), President Ken-
nedy asserted after his election that he temporarily was protected from suit under the
Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940 (42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); 50 U.S.C.
app. §§ 501-93 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), because of his status as Commander-in-Chief.
See Jennifer L. Long, Note, How to Sue the President: A Proposal for Legislation Es-
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tantly, Justice Greenhouse and Justice Epstein, there
is a world of difference between giving testimony in
a case and being a party in a case. And, not only a
world of difference in terms of the demands on one's
time, but also in terms of the corrosion of the Office
of the President.
Are you asking us to place the President above the
law?
It's not a question of placing the President above the
law, because this lawsuit can go forward. It's not a
question of whether it goes forward, but when it will
go forward. In that sense the relief we seek is far
more modest than absolute immunities, which are
ubiquitous in Section 198324 litigation,' and-
But, Mr. Smolla, you are asking for an absolute rule,
aren't you? Are you allowing any kind of exception
to the President being sued?
In order to grant President Clinton the relief he seeks
in this case, this Court would not have to craft an
absolute rule that says, "In all cases, in all civil liti-
gation, automatically the litigation is stayed until the
President leaves office." This Court could say, "In
cases of compelling need, the plaintiff may attempt
to demonstrate that the suit should go forward not-
tablishing the Extent of Presidential Immunity, 30 VAL. U.L. REV. 283, 304 n.154
(1995). The court denied Kennedy's motion for a stay, apparently without a written
opinion, and the case eventually was settled. In Hills v. Kennedy, No. 757,201 (Cal.
Super. Ct. July 5, 1962), Kennedy did not raise the issue of presidential immunity, but
the case was ultimately settled out of court. See Long, supra at 333 n.20.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994); see infra note 36 (quoting the pertinent portion of Sec-
tion 1983).
' See, e.g., Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325 (1983) (finding absolute immunity for
police officers arising out of allegedly false and perjurious testimony); Supreme Court
v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980) (finding absolute immunity for a state su-
preme court when issuing attorney disciplinary rules); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S.
349 (1978) (finding absolute immunity for judges acting in their judicial capacity);
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (finding absolute immunity for prosecutors in
exercise of prosecutorial duties); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (finding
absolute immunity for legislators for actions within the province of legislative proceed-
ings).
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withstanding the presumption that there should be a
stay."
Doesn't that in itself raise the same separation of
powers problem you mentioned before-that some
court is going to have to decide what constitutes
compelling circumstances, and the President may
always say, "Well, I'm very busy now."
I'll concede that, Your Honor, and we'd be delighted
with an absolute rule, but to the extent that the Court
feels it must balance the interests here-because
clearly, the plaintiff has an interest in seeing her suit
proceed as expeditiously as possible-we are conced-
ing that something less than an absolute rule would
be satisfactory. The idea that one can imagine a case
in which the plaintiff's interests would be more acute
than they are here would allow this Court to create
the safety valve for cases of compelling need. So
you'd need not go as far as an absolute rule in order
to get the-
But wouldn't you be back here in that case, saying
that the President never sleeps, and really he still is
immune?
The President in every case would be permitted to
assert the privilege and contest the existence of a
compelling need.
Can you envision anything that the President can do
during the four years of office for which he would
have to stand trial? I know this isn't your case, but if
you're saying the President never sleeps, that sort of
implies there are no unofficial acts of-
Justice Mauro, the district court below actually sug-
gested cases that might meet the compelling need or
extraordinary circumstance test. A child custody case
in which it was in the best interests of the child and
imperative that we make a custody decision quickly
is one example.26 The abatement of a nuisance is
26 See Jones v. Clinton, 869 F. Supp. 690, 698-99 (E.D. Ark. 1994), affd in part,
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another. If the President owned property that was
arguably causing a neighbor to have health problems
or destroy the property, and there was an urgency in
the physical sense to it, then perhaps the plaintiff
could meet the compelling need test.
What if Mrs. Clinton sues for divorce in January?
In that case there would be fundamental rights at
stake, and it arguably would meet the compelling
interest test, but it's not for the President in this
litigation to be required to classify all future possible
cases as compelling or not compelling. If the Court
thinks the crafting of such a safety valve causes more
trouble than it's worth, then an absolute rule is fine.
But in answer to the Chief Justice's original question,
it is our position that something less than an absolute
rule would be constitutionally sufficient here.
If you get a win here, how long would it be then be-
tween the time that the alleged event which precipi-
tated this suit occurred and the time that this case is
finally allowed to go to trial?
If the President is not re-elected, approximately five
years.
Let's assume-
If the President is re-elected, nine years.
Nine years. It wouldn't go to trial immediately af-
ter-
Well, the district court judge indicated that the trial
would begin within weeks after the President left
office, and there would be discovery for some period
of time, whatever that would be.2 Perhaps in light
of the long delay the district court judge would expe-
dite discovery, but it could be ten years.
rev'd in part, 72 F.3d 1354 (8th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996).
21 See id. at 699-700.
19961 259





Now assuming that the President is re-elected, what
would be wrong in his second term with his devoting
attention to some aspects of this case, such as allow-
ing the plaintiff to take depositions from third parties,
having the President submit to a deposition himself,
or having him discuss a settlement with his lawyers?
That is, in effect, what the district court decided,
Your Honor. And our quarrel with that compromise
by the district court is that it underestimates the criti-
cal and time-consuming nature of discovery. As a
practical matter, in a case such as this, discovery is
the whole ball game, and the need of a litigant in a
serious case like this one, involving sexual harass-
ment-where the stakes are high-to confer con-
stantly with lawyers, to deal with witnesses and with
possible impeachment of the testimony of witnesses,
to discuss strategy, and so on, would be a substantial
drain on the energies of the President.
Counsel, isn't your discussion of discovery, though,
more accurately by defense of qualified immunity,
where the Supreme Court has said repeatedly that
qualified immunity is not only a defense to liability,
but also immunity from suit,28 and lower courts
have imposed heightened pleading standard require-
ments? This Court is taking very seriously the bur-
dens of discovery, and that concern is adequately
protected by the qualified immunity defense.
Well, I guess I would submit, Justice Urbonya, that,
if anything, this reinforces the position the President
is taking here. If indeed the President is entitled to
this stay because of the functional needs of the of-
fice, it simply underscores the need for the stay to be
complete and include discovery, as well.
I know that my time is short, and there's a theme
that I would like to bring to the Court's attention,
and that is-
' See, e.g., Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510, 512 (1994); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 526 (1985); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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May I just interrupt you for a second? I just wanted
to double-check-help me out with this-on the
compelling nature of the lawsuit. If we are not going
with an absolute rule, how much weight should we
accord the fact that there was roughly a three-year
time span29 between the alleged incident and the
filing of the lawsuit? Should that have great weight
in our decision regarding whether there is a compel-
ling need to go ahead with the litigation?
It has moderate weight. It is probative of the fact that
time was not of the essence. The fact that the plain-
tiff herself chose to wait until two days before the
statute of limitations ran-nearly three years-before
bringing the suit, certainly underscores, in our view,
that it could not have been that urgent. We don't
argue for any mechanical tests like that, but simply
that it is part of what the Court should take into ac-
count. In modern times, this Court well knows that a
suit like this, if permitted to go forward, would be an
extraordinary spectacle. Imagine the President of the
United States on trial for weeks on charges of sexual
harassment in front of the American people and the
free world. That would not simply be a personal
embarrassment to the President. It would be an em-
barrassment to the office, to the Constitution, and to
the standing of the nation. It is true that there is-
Counselor, don't you think it actually cuts the other
way? If the President is called to answer for his
personal, unofficial conduct, doesn't it say to the
world that there is, in fact, no one above the law?
Your Honor, it would to some degree vindicate that
value. There is no question about that. But placing
the President on trial when he leaves office al-
so-although perhaps not as forcefully and not as
dramatically-underscores that value. You have to
measure the "no person is above the law" value,
which is critical to our American tradition, against
the practical realities of the presidency of the United
States.
29 See Jones, 869 F. Supp. at 691.
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Impeachment is no picnic. The public has survived
that.
But impeachment is the constitutional remedy for
high crimes and misdemeanors. It is not a tool for
allowing any private litigant who can allege in good
faith an arguable wrong to create this drama and hold
the nation-not just the President, but the na-
tion-breathless for weeks as we try to resolve the
status here.
Thomas Jefferson talked about this during the trial of
Aaron Burr., He spoke of presidents being dragged
"from pillar to post" by judges.3" And remember, if
there is no immunity here, there is no immunity from
suit in any forum. Presumably, a cause of action
could have been brought in state court. So you would
not only have acute separation of powers concerns,
but also federalism concerns: a state judge presuming
to exercise authority over the President of the United
States. Although admittedly, as this Court said in
Nixon, there is a regrettable sacrifice that any plain-
tiff sustains when an immunity doctrine is invoked or
a stay is invoked, this Court must measure that sacri-
fice to this plaintiff against the severe damage that
might very well be visited upon the presidency.
Thank you, Your Honors.
Mr. Gerhardt, we'll hear from you now.
30 10 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 404 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1905). President
Jefferson wrote to George Hay, who was the prosecutor at Aaron Burr's treason trial:
But would the executive be independent of the judiciary, if he were subject to the
commands of the latter, and to imprisonment for disobedience; if the several
courts could bandy him from pillar to post, keep him constantly trudging from










Thank you, Your Honor. May it please the Court, my
name is Michael Gerhardt. I represent the respondent,
Paula Jones. This case boils down to a very simple
question: Is the petitioner entitled to a unique immu-
nity that this Court has never recognized nor allowed
for the unofficial acts of any other high-ranking
federal official? The answer is simple-the answer is
no. Mr. Clinton seeks-
This remedy is not that unique. Every state in the
country has a statute which allows state legislators
immunity while the legislature is in session. They are
immune for crimes other than felonies, and they are
immune for civil actions. Why is this so different?
This is not unusual.
This is radically different, Your Honor, for several
reasons. First, there is no such statute in this case.
Second, Mr. Clinton is asking for a constitutional
rule, a rule that is grounded in the Constitution that
would provide for at least some degree of temporary
immunity from a civil lawsuit.3' That degree of im-
munity is unique in American law because no federal
statute or law recognizes it as existing for any other
federal official, including Supreme Court Justices,
senators, representatives, and cabinet officers. That
degree of immunity-
This is not immunity, is it? It's just delay they're
asking for.
The delay itself is a form of immunity. It means no
lawsuit can be brought-
How about diplomats? Isn't that diplomatic immuni-
ty?
31 See Jones, 858 F. Supp. at 906 (granting President Clinton permission to file a
motion to dismiss on the grounds of presidential immunity).
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Your Honor, if I understand the question, certainly
our diplomats would not be entitled to the kind of
immunity Mr. Clinton seeks for the presidency here.
But the issue is, aren't there some public interests
that are so important that judges have the authority,
either by statute or under the Constitution, to delay
litigation? There are some interests that are simply
that important when you weigh the public interest
involved.
I certainly would agree with Your Honor, except that
this case is predicated on acts allegedly committed by
a person before he had been elected President of the
United States. This case is predicated on an unoffi-
cial act of a person who allegedly engaged in the
conduct at issue before he was elected President of
the United States, but who happens now to be Presi-
dent of the United States.
Counselor, Nixon v. Fitzgerald2 stands for the prop-
osition of protecting the presidency, not just looking
at the kind of acts that were at issue in the lawsuit,
but the fact that the President really needs the protec-
tion irrespective of what the lawsuit alleges and the
time frame of when the lawsuit-
Your Honor, insofar as Nixon v. Fitzgerald is con-
cerned, I think if one reviews that case closely, it is
clear that five votes in that case were for exactly the
opposite proposition from the one for which Mr.
Smolla contends.33 In fact, there is a plurality opin-
ion that recognizes only the President's absolute
immunity to damages in a civil case for his official
acts.
If you read the concurrence in Nixon v. Fitzgerald
along with the dissent, those opinions together add
up to five votes in favor of the proposition that the
President is not entitled to any immunity from a civil
32 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
Id. at 744-58. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor joined.
264 [Vol. 5:1
CLINTON V. JONES MOCK ARGUMENTS
THE COURT:
MR. GERHARDT:
case based on his unofficial actions. 4 That's pre-
cisely our position.35
But, Counsel, isn't the question about accounting for
his official actions and alleged abuse of power while
he was Governor? We're not talking about presiden-
tial status; we're talking about the statute that the
Congress passed, under Section 1983,36 which this
Court has interpreted to provide immunity.37 So we
are speaking of a Congressional act. This Court has
applied that section to say that Congress really ex-
pressed an intent in granting immunity for such acts
of governmental officials. A statute you are saying
doesn't exist does, in fact, exist.
With all due respect, I'm not so sure that is an accu-
rate reading of the applicable statute by Your Honor,
but I would-
Chief Justice Burger filed a concurrence, id. at 758-64 (Burger, C.J., concurring),
and Justice White filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Blackmun joined, id. at 764-97 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun filed a separate
dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined, id. at 797-99
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
15 The respondent stated this position in her brief:
[P]residential immunity was limited in Fitzgerald to "acts within the outer perime-
ter of [the President's] official responsibility," and Chief Justice Burger's concur-
ring opinion in that case made clear that Presidents "are not immune for acts
outside official duties." The claim that Fitzgerald supports presidential protection
or immunity for unofficial acts is based upon language taken out of context.
Brief for Respondent at *9, Clinton v. Jones, No. 95-1853, 1996 WL 509501 (U.S.)
(quoting Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 756 (majority opinion) and 759 (Burger, J., concur-
ring)).
36
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, or any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
"' See supra note 25.
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But it was a suit under Section 1983 in Nixon v. Fitz-
gerald. It is broadly the same, I think, as also applied
to the-
Your Honor, in this case, the petitioner has failed to
meet his burden in two respects. The burden is not
just on the petitioner to make his case as to why he
should be entitled to this form of immunity. The
petitioner must also show that Congress has exer-
cised its power to provide for presidential immunity
in the statute under which we have sued. But Con-
gress made no such provision.
You've made the point that no one is above the law,
right?
No one is above the law, Your Honor.
If that's the case, why in your brief do you concede
that the President is entitled to some deference
here?"8
Well, Your Honor, to begin with, I think it's impor-
tant to emphasize that in this case the petitioner is
asking to hide behind the presidency, to hide behind
that office, to use that office as a shield to avoid this
lawsuit. This lawsuit, I would remind the Court, is
based on the unofficial actions of the person who
happens to be the President-
I'm waiting to hear about the deference you would
give to Presidents.
We can remind you perhaps that your client had am-
None of this is to say that the courts do not owe great deference to the presidency
in overseeing litigation. What is needed in this case to protect the public's interest
in the presidency, however, is exactly what the court of appeals prescribed. [T]he
court of appeals directed the district court to engage in "judicial case management
sensitive to the burdens of the presidency and the demands of the President's
schedule."
Brief for Respondent at *34 (quoting Jones v. Clinton, 72 F.3d 1354, 1361 (8th Cir.),
cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 2545 (1996)).
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pie opportunity to sue this defendant before he be-
came President.
Your Honor, as long as this lawsuit was brought at a
time that fell within the statute of limitations, I think
the timing of the lawsuit is irrelevant.
It does indicate that maybe you're not in such a big
hurry.
Your Honor, with all due respect, I don't know that
the Court's making any inferences about my client's
motivations would be appropriate here. There would
have to be findings of fact. Those might have to
go-
Do you think this lawsuit would have been brought
had Mr. Clinton, in 1992, left the governorship of
Arkansas, run in the democratic primaries, and been
defeated? In 1994, would Jones have brought a law-
suit against a Bill Clinton living in Little Rock, Ar-
kansas?
Your Honor, I'm not in a position to answer that
question. I think the critical thing to keep in mind is
that a lawsuit has been brought in a timely fashion.
Brought when Bill Clinton was President of the Unit-
ed States.
But, Your Honor, it was brought on the basis of
actions allegedly taken when he was Governor of
Arkansas. And the question presently confronting this
Court is whether it is appropriate for someone who is
President to avoid civil liability for actions allegedly
committed prior to his election to that office.
Perhaps he wouldn't have been sued if he had not
become President.
Your Honor, I could answer that question by re-
sponding that he would have been sued in any event,
but the question is ultimately irrelevant.
I think the point here is that you are complaining of
26719961








the delay when your client, in fact, caused much of
the delay.
With all due respect, Your Honor, your question
attributes all sorts of motivations to my client. As
long as the requirements of the statute of limitations
have been met, a plaintiff may choose when to file
her claim. As long as the party has complied with the
statute of limitations, any inquiry about the legitima-
cy of the suing party's motivations as to the timing
of filing a lawsuit ends there.
So any inference regarding motivation is improper?
Your Honor, if I understand the Court's questions
correctly, such inferences go ultimately to the merits
of this lawsuit. Yet we've had no findings of fact,
we've had no discovery; therefore, it is inappropriate
at this point to speculate about the merits.
Would you be satisfied if we simply affirmed the
court of appeals?
Yes, we would be perfectly happy with that.
So the rule you're asking us to adopt-I just want to
make sure-is that it makes no difference whether
Mr. Clinton was Governor of Arkansas or President
of the United States at the time of the alleged inci-
dent? The rule would apply to a sitting President as
well as to someone who had acted in a tortious way
before becoming President?
Yes, Your Honor, what I would say is that if, for
example, this lawsuit had been filed before Mr.
Clinton had been elected President but were still
pending at the time he were President, then it would
resemble three other lawsuits in American history. 9
In none of those lawsuits did the Presidents ever
claim any privilege or any immunity from those
lawsuits. Those lawsuits reached final judgments-
" See supra notes 21-23.
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But would he have any persuasive arguments to de-
lay at all during the course of the lawsuit? Can you
envision any circumstances under which a sitting
President would be allowed to-
Absolutely. Yes, Your Honor. That's the point that
the Eighth Circuit was trying to make when it used
the phrase "judicial case management."4 ° It seems to
me that any defendant in a civil case is entitled to
make a showing that he or she should be allowed
some delay in the lawsuit because of-
Do you want a state court judge analyzing, determin-
ing, and rearranging presidential priorities? Do you
want a state court judge holding the President in
contempt for not attending a deposition because the
state court judge thought the deposition was more
important than an NAACP convention?
Your Honor, the recognition that the President of the
United States is not above the law has certain impli-
cations. One of those implications is that when the
President of the United States is legitimately a party
to a civil lawsuit based on his unofficial acts, then
like every other high-ranking official in this nation,
he will have to tend to that lawsuit.
In United States v. Nixon,4 Your Honor, a subpoena
was issued directly against the President. It might
have been embarrassing for President Nixon, it might
have been a bit of a distraction, but it was the unani-
mous opinion of this Court based on the circumstanc-
es of that case that the President was not immune to
being subpoenaed.
Was that action in a criminal action or a civil action?
That action was associated with a criminal case,
Your Honor.
Well, isn't it important that Justice Powell's opinion
~Jones, 72 F.3d at 1361.
~418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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in Nixon v. Fitzgerald"2 distinguished between a
criminal action and a civil action? When all the
plaintiff is seeking are damages in a civil action,
doesn't Justice Powell state very clearly that the
interest in damages yields to the interest in having
the President operate unfettered by litigation?"3
Your Honor, it's important to put Nixon v. Fitzgerald
into context. First, it was a civil case. Moreover, the
point of the case was about the degree to which the
President could be sued on the basis of his official
actions. Everything that was said in that case related
to its particular circumstances.
With regard to unofficial actions, Your Honor, this
Court has never definitively spoken. I would suggest
that a close reading of Nixon v. Fitzgerald would
support the proposition that there were five Justices
in that case who would have been sympathetic to the
point that the President of the United States is not
entitled to any form of immunity from a lawsuit
based-
So you read Justice Powell's opinion and draw no
distinction between criminal action in which the
President might have been involved and the civil
action that he might have paid money damages for?
With all due respect, I'm not sure that distinction has
great relevance here, Your Honor. It seems that inso-
far as a civil case is based on the unofficial actions
of a person who happens to be the President of the
United States, the logic of the opinions both in the
concurrence and in the dissent in Nixon v. Fitzgerald
lead to the conclusion that this lawsuit could pro-
ceed."
42 457 U.S. 731, 733-58 (1982) (Powell, J.).
41 See supra note 17.
4 "Absolute immunity for a President for acts within the official duties of the Chief
Executive is either to be found in the constitutional separation of powers or it does not
exist. The Court today holds that the Constitution mandates such immunity. and I
agree." Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 760 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (emphasis added). "At-
taching absolute immunity to the Office of the President, rather than to particular activi-
ties that the President might perform, places the President above the law." Id. at 766
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If we were to rule in favor of President Clinton in
this case, how would your client be harmed by wait-
ing another four years?
My client and conceivably the nation would be
harmed in a number of different ways.
Your client?
To begin with, there is a statute45 that provides any-
one who seeks to take advantage of it the opportunity
to litigate a lawsuit and vindicate a claim, and so
justice would be delayed and might well be denied if
a person who had tried to vindicate his or her inter-
ests under that statute could not proceed with his or
her lawsuit in a timely fashion. There are all sorts of
problems associated with the delaying of a law-
suit-problems with memories and evidence, for
example. Moreover, Your Honor, delaying this law-
suit as a matter of law would send a signal that is
wholly inappropriate. It would send a signal that a
person can use the presidency as a shield against
accountability based on actions that were taken when
the person was not President of the United States.
It makes no difference whether he was President at
the time for the rule you seek?
Your Honor, the timing of the alleged misconduct is
a critical point. In this case, of course, the actions
that are alleged are said to have occurred before he
took office.
You haven't mentioned fading memories and dying
witnesses and things that you mentioned in the
briefs.46
I tried to allude to that, but, yes, those are some of
the problems resulting from delaying justice.
(White, J., dissenting).
4' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
46 Brief for Respondent at *52, Clinton v. Jones, No. 95-1853, 1996 WL 509501
(U.S.).
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And that your client would be delayed in getting any
damages.
That's correct, Your Honor, but that isn't necessarily
what this lawsuit is all about.
Mr. Gerhardt, how do you address the idea of the
spectacle that would be created by forcing the Presi-
dent of the United States to participate in a trial
before the nation and the entire world? How would
you respond to the idea that the presidency of the
United States stands for something that is viewed
internationally as something important to protect?
And for those of us on the Court who might be con-
cerned about the institution of the presidency, what
can you say that could convince us that the institu-
tion doesn't need a vote that would overturn the
Eighth Circuit?
Well, Your Honor, to begin with, the burden is on
the President in this case to show a legitimate reason
that relates to the particular functions that he has to
perform as President in order to-
But we're talking about the presidency forever, not
about this individual man.
But, Your Honor, Mr. Smolla's argument ultimately,
at least in my opinion, boils down to an absurdity,
because he argues that the only federal official who
has no private life is the President of the United
States. That is simply untrue. Up until the point that
a person becomes the President, that person has, for
purposes of the constitutional law of the presidency,
a private life. Moreover, the President has a private
life after becoming President. In all sorts of other
kinds of civil lawsuits, various problems would arise
if these suits weren't allowed to go forward immedi-
ately after the time of filing. Divorce actions, custody
suits, and tax suits are examples. Any of those law-
suits would run into problems if they were not al-
lowed to go forward simply because of a generalized
assertion that the President has no private life while
in office. Every other high-ranking federal official
certainly has tremendous obligations, but none of
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them can make the claim that they lack the means to
commit unofficial acts or that they have no private
life. None of them can make the claim that while in
office they are not able to engage in unofficial acts.
Nixon v. Fitzgerald says the President is unique be-
cause the President is the head of the executive
branch.
Your Honor, the President is unique in the sense that
he does not share power at the apex at which he sits.
Ultimately, however, I don't think that makes any
difference in this case because he doesn't singularly
exercise all the power of his branch. He delegates
that power to many other people. Consequently, the
person who occupies the office is able to take all
sorts of time from the office in order to do things
unrelated to the office.
Let's get back to the President sharing his power.
I mean through delegations, Your Honor, to his sub-
ordinates.
Who serve at his whim?
Yes, Your Honor, who serve at the whim of the
presidency. Let me rephrase that: Who serve under
the person who happens to be President. But I think
ultimately it's important to understand, Your Honor,
that those people owe their allegiance by virtue of
their duties to serve the government, to the Constitu-
tion, to the offices that they occupy and to the office
that the President occupies.
What's your response to the separation of powers
argument of the other side?
I disagree with it, Your Honor.
Tell me why the judiciary would not be deciding
whether the President has enough time to attend to a
particular matter-looking at his schedule, in other
words?
1996] 273






Your Honor, one of the ironies of the Petitioner's
argument is that in fact he is really arguing for judi-
cial case management by this Court. Petitioner is
simply arguing that this Court should formulate a
rule that would allow for a temporary delay of this
lawsuit as a constitutional proposition. Presidents are
parties to civil lawsuits in all sorts of different ways,
Your Honor. Yet, ever since Chief Justice Marshall
declared it to be so in Marbury v. Madison,47 it has
been the duty of this Court to say what the law is.
That includes declaring the scope of presidential
immunity.
What if we were to split the difference and say that it
is permissible for the depositions to go forward but
not a trial? What would be wrong with that from
your client's point of view? In other words, all the
depositions would be taken. There would be no prob-
lem of memories lost or people dying. Everything
would be on the record but we would allow that the
President is just too busy to undergo the trial itself.
What would be wrong with that?
I think there would be several things wrong with
that. First of all, again, it would be based on the
petitioner's generalized assertion regarding how busy
the President is. In presidential immunity cases, this
Court has made clear that the more particularized the
assertion, the stronger the President's claim seems to
be. In this case, Mr. Smolla has merely argued that
the President is entitled to special treatment because
he is potentially the President twenty-four hours a
day. I fail to see how that's different from a Supreme
Court Justice who also is potentially a Supreme
Court Justice twenty-four hours a day.
What does your client lose, though, if the trial is de-
layed for several years?
In answer to Justice Epstein's question, there is the
possibility of the usual problems with memories
"' 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.) ("It is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
274 [Vol. 5:1
CLINTON V. JONES MOCK ARGUMENTS
THE COURT:
fading and evidence disappearing. In addition, Your
Honor, we need to keep in mind that this is but one
kind of civil suit-there are many types of civil suits.
Thank you, Mr. Gerhardt. Mr. Smolla, you have one
minute and thirty seconds remaining.
ORAL ARGUMENT OF
PROFESSOR RODNEY A. SMOLLA




May it please the Court. Of course it is true that no
one is above the law, but no law is above the Consti-
tution. Judge Learned Hand said that he would
"dread a lawsuit beyond anything else short of sick-
ness and death."48 And we've witnessed in the last
few weeks how the sickness of Boris Yeltsin has
held an entire nation captive. His illness has become
a nation's problem. Well, this litigation-if it were to
go forward-would not be just a President's problem,
but a nation's problem. It is not our submission that
the President has no private life. It is not that he is
attending to the duties of the presidency twenty-four
hours a day. It is rather that the civil litigation arising
from his private life ought in most instances be sub-
ordinated to the compelling Constitutional
needs-both functional and symbolic-of the office
of the presidency, which is unique in our system and
unique in the world.
But, Counselor, why not switch this around? If we
begin with the presumption that the lawsuit should go
forward unless the President can point to specific
factors at a given point in time that compel a delay,
what would be. wrong with that?
What would be wrong with that, Your Honor, is that
it would give no credit to the fact that this is the
President who is the litigant. In the case of an ordi-
48 Learned Hand, The Deficiencies of Trials to Reach the Heart of the Matter, in 3
ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, LECTURES ON LEGAL Topics
105 (1926).
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nary litigant who seeks a stay, who seeks some ex-
ception from the ordinary rules of civil procedure,
surely the burden is on the person seeking the excep-
tion. But the core of our argument here is that the
presidency is unique, as this Court has recognized.
Thank you, Your Honors.
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Smolla. The case is submitted.
DECISION
After fifteen minutes of deliberation, the Court ruled five to four to
reverse the Eighth Circuit, holding that the litigation should not go forward
either in discovery or to trial.
